A Victorian lawyer is to spend a week in prison for contempt after refusing to hand over his email password to the regulator.
A manager was appointed to the lawyer’s practice in December 2025 under the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (Vic), and an order was made on 30 April this year that he provide access to any email accounts used by and/or associated with the practice from 1 March 2024.
When the 88-year-old refused to do this, the Victorian Legal Services Board applied for the practitioner to be charged with contempt.
He was found guilty in Melbourne Supreme Court on 17 June, with Justice Adrian Finanzio remarking at the time: “I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that (the practitioner) has never intended to comply with an order requiring him to provide the login details and passwords to the email account.”
“His refusal to do so has been calculating, deliberate, wilful and contumacious,” Justice Finanzio said.
On 1 July the Court of Appeal had dismissed the practitioner’s application for leave to appeal the finding.
In his penalty judgment delivered on 20 August, which was published last month, Justice Finanzio said the breach of the order was not “casual, accidental or unintentional” as the practitioner submitted.
“Rather, this is a case of a much more serious character, where the breach is contumacious and where, as a result, the contempt should be treated as criminal rather than civil,” he said.
The evidence established that all along, the practitioner sought to “avoid their operation by coming up with contrived alternative interpretations of the orders and arguments to avoid their effect”.
Justice Finanzio said the order to hand over the password “was plain on its face” and compliance could have been “straightforward”.
“It is clear that (the practitioner) sought technical advice, but not for the purpose of assisting him to comply with the order on its terms,” he said.
“(He) sought technical advice to assist him in contriving arguments or artifices to evade compliance with the order.
“In all the circumstances, the only available conclusion on all of the evidence is that, right to the last, (the practitioner) refused to comply with the orders requiring him to provide the password and login details to the email account because he did not accept that those orders should have been made.
“His decision to finally hand over the password cannot be seen as mitigatory of the contempt, coming as it does at the end of such a protracted period of non-compliance, and offered in the circumstances I have described.”
Justice Finanzio said the practitioner showed no contrition, instead suggesting that “the blame for the present situation lies at the feet of the regulator for overzealously pursuing access to the email accounts that were used by him in his legal practice for no good reason”.
“(The practitioner) is entirely responsible for the present state of affairs. (He) alone chose not to comply with the orders. He knew full well the potential consequences of failing to do so,” he said.
In considering the practitioner’s personal circumstances, antecedents and finances, the judge pointed out that the practitioner was an undischarged bankrupt with no dependents and no criminal history, and had practised as a lawyer for decades.
“It is true that he is elderly, and apparently more physically frail than someone younger,” he said.
“At the same time, he has appeared before me demonstrating all the acumen and intelligence of a competent lawyer despite his age.
“He has argued his position as a self-represented litigant since March this year before four judges of the Trial Division of this Court, and before the Court of Appeal.”
The Court “was entitled to expect more of someone who should know better”.
The practitioner had provided no compelling medical evidence that should have a bearing on any final penalty, including detention, he said.
In assessing the effect of the contempt on the administration of justice, Justice Finanzio said lawyers held a special place of privilege in that administration.
“When a lawyer’s conduct is called into question, the fit and proper practitioner invites scrutiny,” he said.
“When the Court makes orders requiring a lawyer to, in effect, co-operate with the regulator, it is expected that the lawyer will abide by those orders.
“Indeed, the expectation of obedience is greater than if an order were made in respect of a person who is not a lawyer, because the Court is entitled to expect that a person admitted to the practice of law as an officer of the Court understands the significance of a court order.
“So when requests by the regulator (or their representative, a manager appointed under the Uniform Law ) have been refused, and then orders of this Court requiring the solicitor to do specified things are deliberately disobeyed, it is not merely a case of contempt for failing to comply with orders of the Court.
“Deliberate disobedience of an order of the Court by a lawyer whose professional conduct has been called into question is an overt rejection of the Court’s authority by a person in the privileged position of making their living from the practice of the law.
“The nature of the contempt strikes at the heart of the Court’s authority and affects the standing of the profession as a whole.”
The VLSB pointed to a similar recent case involving practitioner contempt for obstructing a manager from accessing practice records by changing locks at the firm.
It argued that a financial penalty alone would be both inadequate and, in the result, meaningless because the practitioner was unlikely to have the means to pay any fine.
Justice Finanzio said the recording of a conviction was a penalty in itself but that a custodial sentence must also be imposed to reflect the seriousness of the contempt, and to appropriately denounce and deter others.
“The penalty in this case must record the Court’s strong denunciation of members of the legal profession who behave in the way that (the practitioner) has, and to remind them that the privilege of practice is conditioned by important duties, foremost among them is a duty to uphold the authority of the Court,” he said.
“The penalty here must also reflect that the breach of those duties by deliberately disobeying orders of this Court will be met with a sanction which reflects the importance of the duty.”
A custodial sentence of 45 days was appropriate, but wholly suspending it would be of little personal consequence to the practitioner and too lenient a penalty, Justice Finanzio said.
“In considering whether or not (the practitioner) should serve the whole of his custodial sentence, I feel obliged to take into account (his) age and circumstances.
“Because of his age, in my view, it is appropriate that a substantial part of his custodial sentence be suspended – but not all of it. (He) will serve 7 days of the 45 days.”
Justice Finanzio then granted a stay of the commencement of imprisonment for a period slightly longer than the time within which the practitioner might appeal the decision.
Read the decision here.
Share this article