Parties dispute access time spent with 16-year-old pet dog

Property – Companion animals (pets) – De facto husband fails in seeking orders for 16-year-old dog to accompany child during child’s paternal time.

In Wright & Berger [2025] FedCFamC2F 1315 (22 September 2025), Judge Forbes heard de facto property and parenting applications following the parties’ separation. Their only child “X” was three years old.

The parties agreed to parenting orders for X to live with the respondent de facto wife and spend unsupervised time with the applicant de facto husband, incrementing to five nights per fortnight.

The parties also agreed to property orders to the effect that they each keep the property in their respective possession, but they could not agree to orders regarding a 16-year-old dog, “C”.

C was “adopted” by the respondent de facto wife in 2011, about five years before the parties commenced their relationship in 2016 ([8]-[9]).

The de facto husband sought orders that C be owned by the de facto wife, but that the parties meet C’s veterinary and registration costs equally and that he care for C at the same time as X was in his care pursuant to the parenting orders.

He also sought orders as to changeover for C, that each party notify the other of any serious illness or injury of C and that each be authorised to liaise with C’s vet as to C’s treatment and medical care ([22]).

The de facto wife opposed all orders other than an order that she own C. 

The Court said (from [29]):

“The jurisdiction of the Court to make orders in relation to the ownership of pets is vested in its powers to make orders in respect of property… The court does not have power to make orders imposing a ‘shared custody’ arrangement in respect of an animal pursuant to the parenting powers …  under Part VII of the Act…  ( … )

[70] The court is constrained by s 90SM(6) in the orders it can make…

[74] … [T]he provisions do not alter the fundamental status of companion animals as property, nor do they mandate the application of the parenting considerations as found in the Part VII pathway.

[75] .. [T]he Court can only make one of the three types of orders prescribed in s 90SM(6). What is just and equitable in the making of such orders is to be guided substantially – if not exclusively – by the considerations in s 90SM(7)…”